

die immer in ihrer inneren Konsequenz abgehandelt werden, oder schließlich die trotz aller wissenschaftlichen Akribie gewährte Höhenlage der philosophisch-theologischen Reflexion. Das Letztgenannte hat mich am meisten beeindruckt und an die Lektüre eines Buches von Kremer erinnert, das exakt zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Buchhandel wieder erschienen ist: das 1969 erstmals bei Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, erschienene Werk: Klaus Kremer: Gott und Welt in der klassischen Metaphysik. Vom Sein der Dinge in Gott. Unveränderter Nachdruck 2006, Bond Books – on Demand. Kremers neues Werk atmet dieselbe Frische und Neuheit wie dieses frühere. Beide zeigen: Metaphysik selbst im historischen Vollzug ist lebendig und voller überraschender Gesichtspunkte!

Alois M. Haas, CH-Uitikon Waldegg

Die Sermones des Nikolaus von Kues. Merkmale und ihre Stellung innerhalb der mittelalterlichen Predigtkultur. Akten des Symposions in Trier vom 21. bis 23. Oktober 2004. (Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 30). Trier: Paulinus, 2005.

This volume begins with an overview and a general introduction by **Klaus Kremer**, who reminds us that Nicholas's 293 sermons give us a glimpse of the inner side of Nicholas's thinking, as well as of that thinking's development over a period of some thirty years. Yet, the sermons also furnish us, Kremer further reminds, with new materials such as Nicholas's thoughts about the *lex naturalis*, Nicholas's *devotio Mariae*, and Nicholas's viewing of the Son of God as *novitas absoluta*. Kremer finds not unhelpful Josef Koch's dividing of the sermons into four periods: (a) the time prior to the composing of *De Docta Ignorantia*; (b) the decade from 1439 to 1449; (c) the period of his serving as papal legate to Germany (March, 1451 – March, 1452); and (d) the time of his bishopric in Brixen (April, 1452 – 1458). Without detailing all the locations that Nicholas visited on his mission as papal legate to Germany, Kremer lists the major cities in which Nicholas otherwise preached: Koblenz, Trier, Mainz, Augsburg, Frankfurt, Brixen, Rome. The written sermons, which are really sermon-sketches, constitute one-third of Cusa's written works; and some of them (e. g., in Codex Cusanus 220) are autographs.

The overview gives us many crucial details and is altogether even-handed. For example, Nicholas is said to have been deemed an eloquent preacher by many; but sight is not lost of Nicholas's own admission that he was criticized in Brixen for preaching over the heads of the congregants. Similarly, although Kremer recognizes that the sermons are highly pedagogical in a theological direction, he also points out that Nicholas addresses particular circumstances (a) such as admonishing partakers of the Eucharist to be also attentive listeners to the preached word of God and (b) such as reproving priests for being greedy. Or further, in Sermon CCXXXVI Nicholas – showing concern for his hearers because some of them have come from a distance and must hasten back to the fields, given that the harvest-time has arrived – states that he will shorten his preaching on that feast-day. Elsewhere in order to motivate his listeners, he at times uses poignant dramatizations and illustrations; and, at times, he interprets allegorically and presents fictional dialogues.

In addition to being even-handed, the introductory section is also judicious. For it leaves open certain issues that simply cannot be resolved, or that cannot be resolved with a suitable degree of reliability. Thus, there is no attempt to specify the number of times that Nicholas may have preached in Latin rather than in German. We learn that Josef Koch regarded Sermons I, III, and XXIX as having been delivered in Latin. Rudolf Haubst thinks that Sermons CCLXXXIX – CCXCII were preached in Latin, as was perhaps Sermon I but perhaps not Sermons III and XXIX. Here one might well question Haubst's underlying presupposition, one shared by Koch: viz., the assumption that the fact of these sermons' having been written in better, more stylized, Latin is a sign that they were preached in Latin. For, indeed, this assumption is gratuitous and does not serve as a satisfactory criterion. Looking further, we see that the Introduction is also judicious in leaving open the question of the length of the sermons as they were actually preached. Later in the volume Volker Mertens suggests that during the middle of the 14th century and well into the 15th century some written sermons of other clergy would, if read aloud, last 30 minutes (p. 174) but that the usual duration of a sermon was an hour (p. 188). Probably the best judgment to be rendered is that of Marc-Aeilko Aris: »Was Cusanus tatsächlich gepredigt hat und wie es unmittelbar gewirkt hat, verschwindet im Nebel« (p. 114). And this judgment holds equally true for the assessment of length.

Following the informative introductory section comes **Maarten Hoenen's** insightful contribution entitled »Caput scholae rationis est Christus. Verschränkung von Exegese und Philosophie in den Predigten des Cusanus.« The Latin quotation is drawn from Sermon CCXXVI, n. 16, which exalts Christ as *noster unus magister*. Already in the Early Middle Ages grammar, logic, and metaphysics were important tools for the clergy. One may recall the dispute that Lanfranc and Anselm had with Berengar of Tours as regards the doctrine of transubstantiation and the reference of the demonstrative pronoun »hoc« in the expression »hoc est corpus meum.« Yet, as Hoenen points out, Nicholas was sufficiently aware that »die Regeln der Grammatik und der Logik reichen . . . nicht aus. Die [Heilige] Schrift ist nur dann zu verstehen, wenn der Leser bis zur *intentio scribentis* vordringt. Er muss wissen, was Gott intendierte« (p. 46).

Hoenen makes an interesting observation regarding Nicholas's understanding of the relationship of faith to reason: according to Cusa faith alone gives access to the highest truth; philosophy plays the limited role of clarifying, rather than of grounding, revealed truth (pp. 65f.). Correspondingly, Cusa's method in the sermons is said to differ sizably from the method employed in his other works. For in most of the other works Nicholas begins with points of common ground between believers and unbelievers. He then proceeds to show that these teachings cohere with the teachings of Scripture. In the sermons, however, he begins with the tenets of faith, to which he subordinates the deliverances of natural reason (p. 66). This procedure is partly explainable, we are told, by Nicholas's desire to communicate effectively with his audience – an audience that is influenced by the *via moderna* and that prefers homilies on Scriptural texts to miniature philosophical disquisitions. The earlier sermons, maintains Hoenen, are more concerned with the doctrine of the Trinity,

whereas the later ones are more focused on the purpose and benefits of Christ's death (p. 68). Nicholas sees that philosophy unaided by revelation and grace will end up contradicting Scripture (p. 67). So, in the end, philosophy as it appears in the sermons is tantamount to exegesis (p. 69).

All of the interesting claims in the paragraph above may be challenged. But this present review is not the place to do so. Still, a question does need to be raised, in another context, regarding Hoenen's somewhat incautious use of the term »selbst-evident«: »Die Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit Christi, die sich im [Heiligen] Wort als selbst-evident offenbart« (p. 62). This statement tends to be misleading, because Nicholas is not saying that Christ's teachings in Scripture are self-evidently true. Rather, he is saying that if one accepts Christ's words as the words of God, then he will accept them as true, on the basis of his belief that God is Truth itself. But he may not know or may not believe that the words are really the words of God (Sermon CLIV, n. 3). Even more misleading is Hoenen's assertion that according to Nicholas it is »unmöglich, nicht an Gott zu glauben, wenn der Glauben [sic] geschenkt wird« (p. 62, n. 79). For, in the passage that Hoenen is referring to, Nicholas is not speaking about *der Glaube an Gott* but about the fact that if one apprehends the words of Scripture to be, indeed, the words of *God*, then he cannot doubt that they are true. But, of course, he can doubt (as Cusa well realizes) that the words are truly God's, even as he can doubt that there is a God. Hoenen is actually advancing the following truism: it is impossible to believe in God if God gives one the belief in God. Now, not even Anselm's Fool of Psalms 13:1 (14:1) would reject such a claim. Finally, Hoenen is incautious in using the word »unverkennbar«: »In der Person Jesu Christi . . . zeigt sich die Wahrheit zwar in der Gestalt des Menschen, jedoch in seiner ganzen Vollkommenheit. Cusanus spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von der *consummatio absoluta* der Wahrheit. In dieser absoluten Form ist sie unverkennbar. Wenn sich der Mensch für das Wort Christi öffnet, bekräftigt er dessen unmittelbare Wahrheit, da diese Wahrheit der Beginn und das Ziel seiner Selbsterkenntnis ist . . .« (p. 62). However, Cusa does not mean, in Sermon CLIV, n. 3, that truth as it is revealed in and through Christ is *unverkennbar*. He means only that »si caperet praecepta esse Dei, non posset illa reicere«: »If one were to apprehend that the precepts are God's, then he could not reject them.« But, as Nicholas explicitly says, a man might, out of ignorance, not recognize that the precepts are from God. Hoenen, *at best*, is presenting us once again with a truism: »Wenn sich der Mensch für das Wort Christi öffnet [d. h., wenn sich der Mensch das Wort als das wahre Wort des Gott-Mensch Christus ohne jeden Zweifel anerkennt], bekräftigt er dessen unmittelbare [und für ihn unverkennbare] Wahrheit. . .«

One misses, with regard to the topic of »eine Verschränkung von Exegese und Philosophie,« a discussion of Nicholas's tendency to interpret Scripture figuratively along philosophical lines. A prime example of this approach is found in Sermon CCVII, n.12, where the five loaves of bread in John 6:9 are interpreted as signifying objects of the five different senses. Another such example occurs in Sermon CXXX, n. 4, where the words from Luke 10:38 »intravit in castellum« lead Nicholas to construe the *town* (*castellum*) as the *human species*. Or again, the Apostle Paul's stating (I

Cor. 11:3) that the man is the head of the woman is interpreted by Nicholas as meaning that reason is to rule over appetite (Sermon CLXXXIII, n. 2).

Walter Euler takes up the topic of the various themes that are to be found in the sermons and of the extent to which these themes do or do not change over the span of the sermons. Taking his lead from the end of Nicholas's *De Aequalitate*, Euler notes that Nicholas himself maintained that in his sermons his apprehension of the Gospel-message changed over time. Euler sketches the three stages to which Nicholas alludes: (1) 1430–1436/40, the period before Nicholas became a priest (Sermons I – XVIII or I – XXI, depending upon the dating of his consecration as priest); (2) 1440 – 1449, the period of the priesthood (Sermons XXII – LXXV); (3) 1450 onwards, the period of his bishopric (Sermons LXXVI – CCXCII, Sermon CCXCIII being written after *De Aequalitate*). Euler concedes that not all of the sermons can be dated with certainty. And he acknowledges that Nicholas preached some sermons for which we have no written sketches and that of the sermons for which we do have sketches, some of the sketches were composed after (rather than before) the sermon was preached. The emphases in the sermons change with the liturgical occasions, with the situations of the hearers, and with Nicholas's role as deacon, priest, bishop, and cardinal (p. 74). But they do not develop in the simple way that Nicholas explains in *De Aequalitate*, thinks Euler, who opts for identifying four different periods: (1) the 1430s; (2) the first half of the 1440s; (3) the second half of the 1440s; and (4) the 1450s. And whereas in the passage in *De Aequalitate* Nicholas focuses on the changes in his understanding of the Gospel-message, Euler details some of the ways in which this apprehension relates to the joint-themes of theological anthropology and of Christ's incarnation.

Furthermore, Euler discerns that Nicholas's sermons prior to 1450 are more scholastic in tone, whereas those after 1450 are more homiletical, more centered on expounding and interpreting various Scriptural texts (p. 88). Nicholas's message does *not* develop, says Euler, from a dim apprehending of the Gospel-message to a clearer, brighter apprehension, as is said in *De Aequalitate*; rather, Nicholas moves from a traditional proclamation of faith to a more idiosyncratic and philosophically oriented understanding of faith (p. 90). Euler further judges that Nicholas esteemed the two bound-collections of his sermons (Codices Vaticani 1444 & 1445) as containing materials that were on an intellectual par with his other philosophical and theological works (p. 76). Indeed, some of Nicholas's sermons – in particular, and especially, XXII, XXIV, and XLI – are »small theological masterpieces« (p. 85). One such highly theological passage relates to Nicholas's doctrine – in accordance with Colossians 1:27 – that we find within ourselves Christ, who is the perfection of our nature.

The movement of my humanity is for the purpose of my attaining God in and through a man who is of my humanity. I find, then, in myself a man who is of my humanity [and] who is a man in such a way that He is also God. And this is the man in whom alone I can attain rest in my humanity; for rest is God. Therefore, that man who is also God is He unto whom all men are moved in accordance with the nature of humanity. And this is Blessed Christ Jesus. This Jesus was the Hidden One desired by all nations (Sermon XLI, n. 9 – 10).

Marc-Aeilko Aris deals with the sociology of the recipients of the sermons. He makes the intriguing observation that Nicholas himself is the first recipient of his own sermons. For Nicholas reworks them, corrects and expands them, rearranges their ordering, occasionally cross-references them, and plans to make them, first, into a *liber sermonum* and then into *libri sermonum*. The first collection, which was made for the monks at Tegernsee, has been lost; but we can infer something about it from ms. Magdeburg 38. The *libri sermonum* are the two Vatican manuscripts 1244 and 1245. In having these volumes copied (some time between 1456 and 1459, according to Haubst), Nicholas arranged the sermons chronologically, whereas they may be inferred to have been previously arranged by theme for the Tegernsee monks, if ms. Magdeburg 38 is a good indicator. In planning for the broader readership that the books would bring, Nicholas switched the focus of his sermons from the audience of actual listeners – whether clerics or laymen – to the envisioned audience of future readers (pp. 98 & 114).

Volker Mertens, in his contribution, supplements things said by Aris, though doing so is not his aim. Like Aris, he investigates the relationship between Cusa's oral sermons and his written sermons; and he, too, points to their difference of emphasis. He helpfully situates Nicholas's sermons by comparing their style and form with those of Berthold von Regensburg, Peregrinus von Oppeln, Jakob von Paradies, and Johannes Geiler von Kayserberg. And he points out that the Vatican Codices 1244 and 1245 were intended by Nicholas to serve a double purpose: (a) that of contributing to his heritage and (b) that of being useful in a practical way to clergy (p. 185). Mertens sees, too, that the early sermons cite many authorities and that they excerpt many ideas from others, whereas the later sermons show more independence and more freedom of thought (p. 182). In Brixen, judges Mertens, Nicholas directed his sermons mainly toward the clergy (p. 190). Perhaps, continues Mertens, this fact explains why there was no demand for Nicholas to write down for posterity these »Lehrpredigten« in the Volkssprache. After all, he was not writing for the *Winzer* but for the *belehrten und gelehrten*, so that Latin was the appropriate language. Since he wrote only one sermon in German (viz., XXIV) and since we have only one *reportatio* of a sermon that he preached in German (viz., LXXVI), we have virtually no traces of the German wording of the sermons that, though written in Latin, were oftentimes preached in the Volkssprache (pp. 181 & 189). It seems ironic that although Mertens concedes that we do not know the wording of the sermons as preached in German, he nonetheless cannot resist the temptation to make the following surmising inference about »die volkssprachliche Predigt des Cusanus«: »Wenn wir sie in der Predigtlandschaft des 15. Jh.s situieren, so liegt sie zwischen der Pfarrpredigt ... und der hochtheologischen Predigt Meister Eckharts relativ nahe bei diesem« (p. 189).

The theme of Cusa's relationship to Meister Eckhart is addressed directly and extendedly by **Georg Steer**, who affords a plethora of details: Eckhart has 243 sermons, 50 fewer than does Cusa. Of these, 140 are in German, 103 in Latin. Both the Latin sermons and the German sermons influenced Cusa. Indeed, Cusa had the Latin sermons copied, so that today they are found in Codex 21 of the library in his

hospice at Kues. And, in general, Nicholas in his sermons mentions Eckhart by name 26 times and refers to his *Commentary on John* 60 times.

Steer takes up the topic of Nicholas's defense of Eckhart in his, Nicholas's, *Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae*. And he refers to the reappearance, in Cusa's sermons, of Eckhart's teachings on *filiatio* (*deificatio*), on the Eucharist, and on the threefold birth of the Son of God (p. 165). To be sure, Steer's article is very informative. And it wisely concludes that in order rightly to assess Eckhart's influence on Cusa we need to take account, as well, of Cusan works other than the sermons – as Steer himself begins to do by glancing at Cusa's *De Filiatione Dei* and at his *Apologia*. Steer includes – on pp. 148f., n. 17 – a helpful list of articles and books that explore Eckhart's intellectual kinship with Cusa. It would have been of equal value to the reader had he also included such bibliographical information as regards the question of whether Eckhart's German sermons were authorized or unauthorized *reportationes* – whether, indeed, some of them were *ordinationes*, i. e., were copies of autographs. Kremer, in the Introduction, takes some steps in this direction, by referring to Koch, Ruh, and Pauli (p. 20, n. 40).

Kazuhiko Yamaki deals with the topic of Cusa's use of the metaphor of a book. He admits that by Cusa's day the use of this metaphor had become traditional (p. 118). He seeks to show the many applications that Nicholas made of the metaphor; and he examines putative developments of the metaphor within not only Cusa's sermons but also his works generally. Yamaki definitely succeeds in showing the extensive roles that the book-metaphor plays in Nicholas's thought. For Nicholas regards as books not only humanly produced bound-manuscripts and the Divinely inspired books of the Bible but also the following: the world-book; the living book of Christ's humanity; the book of the human soul, or human heart; the Heavenly book of life; the book of conscience; the book of man's intellectual nature (pp. 117f.); the books of the senses (p. 139); and the inner book of the self (p. 143). Since Yamaki could not possibly have time to develop all of these themes in the space allotted him, he concentrates, in general, on making us aware of this wide-ranging variety and, in particular, on pointing to two factors: viz., (a) to that which is unusual and (b) to how the metaphor of the world-as-a-book is a changing metaphor.

One thing that Yamaki sees as unusually engaging is Cusa's discussion of the fact that a reader of the world-book can become *raptus* (p. 135), analogously to St. Paul's having been caught up unto the third heaven (II Cor. 12:2). Another captivating Cusan tenet that Yamaki identifies is Cusa's affirmation that Christ regarded all Scripture as being about Him Himself and that Christ helps us to see God in the book of nature (p. 129). Here Yamaki might have pointed out, but does not, that the Layman (Latin: *Idiota*) is wise *because*, and *insofar as*, he can read the book of nature. For the Layman cannot read ordinary books, or even the Bible, since he is illiterate (Sermon CXXV, n. 4:7–8). Furthermore, one of Yamaki's central claims must be called into question: viz., that prior to 1446 and to Sermon LXXI, n. 13, Cusa did not regard the visible world – the world-book – as playing a positive role in leading us to a knowledge of God: »Die entscheidende Wende in dieser Predigt ist, dass dem Weltbuch nun eine positive Rolle bei der Gottessuche zugemessen wird . . .« (p. 122).

But, in disagreement with Yamaki's claim about a turning-point in Nicholas's thinking, we may adduce the following facts: (1) Already (though Yamaki denies it) in Sermon XXIII (from the year 1441) Nicholas points to the world as affording a knowledge of God. He does so in his hypothetical example of a solitary first man – call him Adam – who enters the as yet unpopulated world and who from inspection of the heavens and of the earthly objects is able to infer the existence of a triune First Beginning – a Beginning that is Oneness, Equality, and Union. (See sections 15–17 in the sermon.) (2) Even in *De Filiatione Dei* (from the year 1445) we find that Nicholas tells us not to *cling* to sensory objects but nevertheless to *use* them, contemplatively, as stepping-stones to things intellectual, so that from things intellectual we may ascend contemplatively unto learning more of God (*De Fil.* II, n. 61). (3) Similarly, *De Quaerendo Deum* (also from the year 1445) addresses the theme of our ascending contemplatively from perceptual apprehension to intellectual apprehension and, thereafter, upwards unto God, who is above all sense, reason, and intellect (*De Quaer.* I, n. 24–27 and III, n. 43).

Nicholas's evaluation of the empirical world as a stepping-stone to a knowledge of God does not significantly change during his adult lifetime. Just as in the sermons he does not deny that there is an infinite disproportion between the finite and the infinite, so too in the sermons he is aware that »the invisible things of God, including His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, by means of understanding created things« (Rom. 1:20). Indeed, his marshalling of this latter verse comes as early as in Sermon VIII, n. 8, from the year 1431.

The volume contains two supplementary articles – one in which **Klaus Kremer** analyzes Cusa's notion of *visio intellectualis* and one in which **Karl Bormann** disputes certain criticisms made of his Latin-German edition and translation of *De Venatione Sapientiae*.

Kremer makes ten central points, all of which are defensible and which we may summarize as follows:

(1) *Visio intellectualis* is to be distinguished from *visio mystica*. (2) The phrase »*visio intellectualis*« is ambiguous. At times, it is used by Nicholas to refer to the future Heavenly state, and, at times, it is used by him to refer to this present earthly pilgrimage. In the Heavenly state *visio intellectualis* is the face-to-Face vision of God (*visio facialis*). (3) Moreover, in this present earthly state there is a distinction between our viewing, intellectually, the ultimate Ground of all things and our viewing the intelligible content that is detectable in that which is perceptual. (4) Furthermore, Nicholas speaks of the historical Jesus's acts of seeing, in their perfection, as a kind of intellectual beholding. (5) In certain contexts *visio intellectualis* is called by Nicholas *visio divina*; but it is never called *visio absoluta*. (6) H. Schwaetzer misleads us when he views Nicholas as anticipating German Idealism's doctrine of *das sich selbst anschauende Ich*. (7) Nicholas speaks of God as the *Forma formarum* rather than as the *Idea idearum*. (8) In Nicholas's thought *visio intellectualis* is distinct from *visio intelligentialis*. (9) *Visio intellectualis* is associated with *lumen intellectuale*. (10) By »seeing« Nicholas sometimes means *knowing*, as is evidenced by his expression »*visio intellectualis sive cognitio*« in Sermon CLXXXVII, n. 16.

Bormann, for his part, touches upon many textual and translation areas that are of interest only to scholars. His remarks respond to certain of Mischa von Perger's criticisms of his translation and edition entitled *Die Jagd nach Weisheit* (Heft 24 (2003) in the series *Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues in deutscher Übersetzung* (Hamburg: Meiner). The remarks also respond to Perger's criticisms of Klibansky and Senger's critical edition of the Latin text (Vol. XII (1982) in the series *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner). Many of these criticisms are picayune and are made severely, so that Bormann cannot be faulted for showing irritation in his replies, though on occasion these replies are not on target. For example, Bormann is perfectly correct (p. 234) in reminding Perger that Nicholas sometimes uses »*implicat*« to mean »*implicat contradictionem*«, something that Perger seems not to have known. Similarly, Bormann is justified in reminding Perger and the rest of us (pp. 233f.) that Nicholas admitted that he had difficulty with the Latin language. Accordingly, some of Nicholas's Latin sentences are imperfectly formed, so that this fact needs to be kept in mind. On the other hand, Bormann misses the mark when he responds (p. 235) to Perger's objecting to his translation of »*puta*« in the phrase »*in maxime ludico*, [misprint here for »*lucido*«] *puta sole*« (n. 16). Bormann translated it as »zum Beispiel«; and Perger points out that »zum Beispiel« is a mistranslation, since the maximally bright object to which Nicholas is referring is uniquely the sun. Bormann's response about how Nicholas does (specifically, in *De Coniecturis*) conceive of more than one object as maximally bright, depending upon the domain (perceptible world, intelligible world, Heaven qua God's abode), is irrelevant. For in the passage in *De Venatione Sapientiae* – the passage under discussion – Nicholas is speaking only of the perceptible world, so that »*puta*« should be translated either as »nämlich« or should (as Perger suggests) be left untranslated, so that »*sole*« becomes an appositive.

As for the volume as a scholarly whole, we may judge it to be of very high quality both in terms of the information that it affords and in terms of the sensitivity with which the information is nuanced.

One will also appreciate the fact that the volume contains tributes to two long-time Cusanus scholars: Raymond Klibansky, who died on August 5, 2005, two months before what would have been his one-hundredth birthday on October 15, and Maurice de Gandillac, whose one-hundredth birthday was celebrated on February 14, 2006. Included, furthermore, is an obituary for the Italian Cusan scholar Giovanni Santinello (February 1, 1922 – August 22, 2003). And there are certain ceremonial items: Dr. Helmut Gestrich gives a word of farewell as he leaves the role of Chairman of the Cusanus-Gesellschaft; correspondingly, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lentzen-Deis gives a word of greeting as he newly assumes the role of Chairman. In addition, Klaus Kremer expresses gratitude to Dr. Gestrich and to Dr. Reinhard Marx, Bishop of Trier, who delivered the sermon, and celebrated mass, at the religious service organized in conjunction with the Symposium.

A book-review and several indices conclude the volume in a standard way.

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